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If robots are going to share human homes, workplaces and social spaces in the future, how 
will they communicate with people, and how might this frame people’s perceptions of them? 
Should a robot’s communication style reinforce the sense in which they seem to be somewhat 
alive, trustworthy assistants, co-workers or possibly even friends? Is there value in people 
recognizing and respecting the agency of robots, while also being reminded that even the 
most personable social robot is a machine that can be switched off? The questions in this list 
are too complex to answer fully in this short chapter. Its aim, instead, is to offer a starting 
point for discussing such questions: to demonstrate how a detailed analysis of people’s 
communication with and about robots from a number of communication theoretical 
perspectives is a productive way to think through the deployment of robots into everyday life. 
 
Theorizing Communication between Humans and Robots 
As might be expected, communication with robots is often discussed in terms that draw upon 
cybernetic theory. The cybernetic tradition of communication theory considers 
communication in terms of information processing and exchange. It is an archetypal 
transmission model, which places particular value on precision in the coding of messages 
(Craig, 1999). Alongside this, from the perspective of the semiotic tradition, communication 
occurs through intersubjective mediation that employs shared languages and other sign 
systems (Craig, 1999). These theoretical traditions offer different ways to analyze 
communicative situations, cybernetics valuing the way that meaning emerges within coded 
exchanges, while semiotics focuses on the nuances of meaning conveyed by signs and 
language; however, the two can also be seen to work together in discussions of human-robot 
communication when combined in cybernetic-semiotic theory that emphasizes the value of 
conveying precise information in a human language or with humanlike signs (Sandry, 2015). 
From a cybernetic-semiotic perspective, people and robots must be able to communicate 
clearly using shared language and signs, such that robots can take instructions from people 
and respond in ways humans can easily understand (Sandry, 2015). 
Although the exchange of information is an important part of building relations with 
robots, the sociocultural tradition of theory adds another facet most often drawn upon when 
discussing robots that are designed to be “social.” In particular, sociocultural theory describes 
communication as a process through which people’s understandings of the world are 
produced, shared and reproduced (Carey, 1992; Craig, 1999). This perspective emphasizes 
the ways in which social robots and their communications are often framed to fit alongside 
human lives and understandings of the world as seamlessly as possible. Other discussions of 
robots focus on their ability to persuade people, or at least attempt to persuade them, to act in 
particular ways (Bartneck, van der Hoek, Mubin, & Al Mahmud, 2007; Gonzales & Riek, 
2012). These analyses of communication draw on a sociopsychological tradition, which is 
concerned not only with a process of information transmission between sender and receiver, 
but also the effect of the message, and the way in which the receiver’s existing 
understandings, attitudes and beliefs support or undermine the desired outcome of the sender 
(Craig, 1999). 
The cybernetic-semiotic, sociocultural and sociopsychological traditions are the 
theoretical perspectives on communication that are most overtly drawn upon in discussions 
about the design of robots that are expected to interact with people (Sandry, 2015). As an 
alternative, which provokes a broader understanding of the possibilities of human-robot 
interaction, this chapter also considers the phenomenological tradition of communication. 
This tradition theorizes communication as the experience of otherness (Craig, 1999). It 
therefore offers a definition of communication as an event that does not require precise 
information exchange, the sharing of familiar sociocultural perspectives or the exertion of 
persuasive power, but rather requires being open to and respectful of otherness (Peters, 1999; 
Pinchevski, 2005). Adopting a phenomenological perspective emphasizes the possibility of 
relating to robots as a form of quasi-other, or maybe more productively as technological 
others that are valuable in their own right (not just because they are somewhat like human 
others). This perspective offers new ways to explore the potential of supporting people’s 
responses to robots as nonhuman beings with which they might want to interact at home, at 
work or in social spaces, while also reminding people that, as machines, robots might need to 
be rebooted, repaired or replaced with a newer model. 
Considering the details of communication with and about robots through the lens of 
these theoretical traditions supports a broad understanding of the variety of ways that robots 
convey a sense of their personality and “aliveness” to the humans with whom they 
communicate. As will be considered in more detail below, one advantage of assessing robots 
as somewhat “lively” is that it encourages people’s recognition of the agency of robots and 
the value of their responses to and actions on the world. This takes human-robot interaction 
beyond tool use to introduce the potential for collaborative team working, because a robot’s 
otherness can encompass nonhuman skills and abilities to be employed alongside human 
collaborators in creating multi-skilled human-robot teams. For human-robot teams to work to 
their best joint ability, human team members need to keep in mind the nonhuman advantages 
the robot has and work with the robot, rather than seeking to control it as a tool. In addition, 
humans may also need to support the robot in light of nonhuman disadvantages from which it 
might suffer in certain environments. It is therefore important that, even as a robot’s 
communication supports shared understanding and team-working with humans, the potential 
for robots to remind people of their machinelike nature is not forgotten. As machines, robots 
not only have nonhuman skills and abilities, but also, on most occasions, can be switched off 
as necessary and without lasting damage. It therefore seems vital that the communication of a 
robot’s liveliness and personality, supporting rich human-robot interactions and 
collaborations, should not occlude people’s sense of the robot as a machine. 
This chapter considers how and why the seeming “aliveness” of robots can and should 
be juxtaposed with an understanding of them as machines by analyzing the details of human-
machine communication with three robot examples, all designed to communicate with 
humans, two factual and one fictional. The three illustrative examples were chosen because 
of the availability of texts that show and/or discuss the course of human interactions with the 
robots in some detail. The aim of this research is to provide a framework that demonstrates 
how different communication traditions offer a variety of useful theoretical perspectives on 
human-machine communication. Future research could draw on this strategy to consider how 
other robots and humans might interact now and in the future, in ways that enable humans to 
relate to and collaborate with them, while also maintaining a clear sense of the machine’s 
technological otherness. 
 
Relating to Social Robots as Humanlike Communicators 
Cynthia Breazeal, creator of Kismet, one of the earliest robots specifically designed to take 
part in social interactions with humans, states that a “sociable robot” should be “socially 
intelligent in a humanlike way” (Breazeal, 2002a, p. 1). Her goal in creating Kismet, amongst 
other sociable robots, has been to make people’s interactions with the robot like “interacting 
with another person” (Breazeal, 2002a, p. 1). From Breazeal’s perspective, Kismet’s 
sociability was supported by its expressive face and ability to turn-take in dialogue with 
people, most often using a toddler-like “babble” as opposed to fully formed human language. 
Breazeal argues that humanoid robots have the potential to receive, interpret and reciprocate 
“familiar social cues in the natural communication modalities of humans”, because they 
“share a similar morphology with humans” (Breazeal, 2002b, p. 883). Christoph Bartneck et 
al. make a similar assumption, justifying selection of the iCat robot for their experiment on 
human responses to being asked to switch off a robot, because it “can generate many 
different facial expressions, such as happiness, surprise, anger or sadness, that are essential in 
creating social human-robot interaction dialogues” (2007, pp. 218-219). While neither 
Kismet nor iCat are realistically humanlike in appearance, one of the keys to their socially 
communicative ability, at least from Breazeal’s and Bartneck et al.’s perspectives, is a face 
that can produce humanlike facial expressions. 
As this chapter goes on to note, and Breazeal’s more recent robot designs 
demonstrate, perceptions of the social nature of robots can be supported in ways that involve 
less humanlike facial designs than seen in either iCat or Kismet, through development of 
machinelike robots that are nonetheless highly expressive and communicative. However, 
before moving on to discuss more recent examples of social robots, it is worth considering 
Bartneck et al.’s findings using iCat, employing a range of communication theoretical 
perspectives to analyze how a sense of the intelligence and personality of a robot is built up, 
such that it causes people to hesitate when asked to turn it off. This example provides a 
particularly relevant starting point and is discussed in some detail, because it directly 
investigates people’s responses when asked to switch off a robot with which they have 
developed a connection over time, the perceived “ability” and “personality” of the robot 
being seen to shape the strength of feeling against switching the robot off. 
 Bartneck et al.’s experiment asked people to collaborate with iCat in playing 
Mastermind with a computer. This game involves players in trying to guess a pattern of 
colors chosen by the computer. Each guess is scored based on correct color and/or position, 
so subsequent guesses can be chosen strategically based on this information. Participants 
were told the overall goal of the experiment was to see how the robot’s personality would 
build over the game. Once the game was over, people were asked to switch-off the robot, 
having been told that this would permanently wipe the robot’s memory and the personality it 
had developed. In fact, the robot was always under the control of the experimenter, as 
opposed to building its personality autonomously. The experimenter operated the iCat either 
in high agreeableness or in low agreeableness mode and, in addition, made the robot suggest 
colors in highly or less intelligent ways. The highly agreeable iCat would politely ask if it 
could make suggestions in relation to the game, whereas the disagreeable iCat would simply 
insist it took its turn, rather than collaborating with the human. As soon as the person was 
asked to switch it off, the iCat would speak up, begging to remain on. The dial to switch the 
robot off was linked with the robot’s voice, such that turning the dial slowed the iCat’s voice 
until it eventually stopped completely. Participants were not forced to switch off the iCat, but 
they all did in the end. Many people hesitated both before and while turning the dial, in 
particular those who experienced the more intelligent robot that had also been an agreeable 
collaborator.  
iCat’s communication during the experiment involved the cybernetic-semiotic 
transmission of precise information through its voice as it either stated the color it would like 
to try on its turn, or suggested colors the team could try next. The color it chose was also 
displayed by lights in its ears, in a form of nonverbal communication that reinforced its 
choice for the human. At this level, the clarity of iCat’s communication was linked with the 
idea that it was intelligent, appearing more intelligent the better its color suggestions proved 
to be. Alongside this, people also based their judgement of iCat on the social nuances of its 
interaction. In sociocultural terms, it was when the robot was polite in suggesting potential 
colors to try, as opposed simply to insisting on taking its turn, that this robot seemed to want 
to work intelligently alongside the human, behaving in acceptable and familiar ways to 
negotiate the choice the team might make next. These aspects of the robot’s communication 
therefore supported human assessments of its intelligence and personality, while also 
conveying the sense that it was a “lively” partner with which to play Mastermind. At the end 
of the experiment, human participants were faced with the iCat’s sociopsychological attempts 
to persuade them to ignore the instruction they had been given when it begged to remain 
switched on. Although not mentioned overtly by Bartneck et al. in their written paper, the 
linked video of the experiment shows that when iCat pleaded with users in this final stage of 
the experiment, its facial expressions and head and neck movements strongly reinforced the 
sense of its distress at the prospect of being switched off, adding to the sociopsychological 
effect of its words. 
In this experiment, the robot was situated as a partner with which to play a game, 
introducing a sociocultural frame within which people were encouraged to assess the robot’s 
communication. The sense of being in a team with the robot was therefore reinforced for 
participants when the intelligent robot adopted a more socially aware and polite 
communication style, making its sociopsychological influence that much stronger at the end 
of the experiment. The idea that turning off the robot would result in the permanent loss of its 
memory and the personality it had supposedly built up over the course of the interaction, 
alongside the fact that its voice and facial expressions strongly indicated its desire to remain 
on, likely gave people the sense that switching it off would be a form of “death” for that 
version of the robot at least. 
Although the fact that “robots can exhibit life like behavior” does not mean they are 
“alive” in the same sense as humans and animals (Bartneck et al., 2007, p. 217), keeping this 
in mind may be particularly difficult when interacting with robots that appear to express 
humanlike emotions and might therefore be assumed to experience humanlike feelings. 
Maybe it is no wonder that people who had played Mastermind in a team with the more 
social and polite personality for this robot hesitated before switching it off. Scholars have 
suggested that human perceptions of the apparent “aliveness” and “emotional state” of robots 
may be problematic. One fear is that human relations with these robots might lead people to 
devalue the feelings of trust and friendship experienced within human-human relations 
(Turkle, 2011; Gerdes, 2015). The results of the experiment with iCat do raise the question 
about whether the relations that people develop with social robots over longer periods of time 
might cause them to think twice before either switching the robot off, or leaving it to its 
“death” in a house-fire, for example. Of course, a social robot in the home would likely have 
a personality that was safely stored, or at least backed up, in a cloud computer system, but in 
moments of stress, would owners be likely to remember this and decide to abandon the robot 
itself?  
 
The New Breed of Social Robot 
The question of how human-robot interactions might be experienced in homes in the 
relatively near future leads to an analysis of Jibo,1 about which a considerable amount of 
marketing material and technical journalism coverage exists. Jibo is one of a number of social 
robots currently being developed for long-term home use; others include Buddy2 and Zenbo.3 
The design details of Jibo, Buddy and Zenbo differ from one another, notably Buddy and 
Zenbo can move around houses autonomously, while Jibo must be moved by hand. This may 
be because the focus for Jibo’s design team has been on developing the robot’s expressive 
personality and ability to communicate in ways that support the sense that this robot can 
become part of the family. In spite of a long delay prior to release, the Jibo website tagline is: 
“He can’t wait to meet you,” a statement that immediately genders Jibo and promotes the 
sense that this intelligent and sensitive robot wants to be your friend. 
The original promotional video for Jibo explains how he can act as a photographer, 
read out emails, remind people of appointments, record and play back voice messages, 
remember a person’s past preferences, and be an educator with the help of interactive 
applications. The video shows the practical tasks Jibo undertakes, but the narrative also 
indicates that, in social terms, Jibo should be positioned somewhere between your things 
(house, car and toothbrush) and your family. The video suggests that members of the family 
are drawn into an emotional connection with the robot, such that Jibo receives thanks and is 
wished goodnight. The language used throughout situates Jibo as an intelligent agent, 
eventually overtly stating that Jibo isn’t really just a form of sophisticated technology, but 
rather is “one of the family”. Breazeal’s aims with Jibo are to “humanize technology”, by 
making a robot that treats “you like a human being” and acts “like a partner rather than 
simply being a tool” (Jibo Robot, 2014). 
The promotional text on the Jibo website (Jibo, Inc., 2017) explains that this robot 
“experiences the world, and reacts with thoughtful movements and responses.” The robot is 
again positioned as practically helpful, able to “snap a photo or send a message” on your 
behalf, but also as wanting to develop “more meaningful relationships” by getting “to know 
you and the people you care about”, so that “he becomes more and more a part of the funny 
stories, tender moments, and warm memories families share” (Jibo, Inc., 2017). Jibo may 
exist somewhere between your things and your family to begin with, but his longer-term goal 
is to become part of the family over time. In short teaser videos on the website, Jibo explains 
that he doesn’t feel like a robot, plays staring competitions and tells (bad) jokes, including 
making fun of his lack of hands. Jibo was clearly designed to appeal through his cute 
personality and appearance, as Roberto Pieraccini, one of the people who worked on the 
prototype for this robot, admits (Rozenfeld, 2017). 
At the level of completing tasks, such as taking photographs and issuing reminders, 
interactions with Jibo are mostly reliant on a cybernetic-semiotic process of information 
transmission using a voice interface. The robot listens for his name, “Hey, Jibo!”, in a similar 
way to Apple’s Siri and Amazon’s Alexa (embodied as the Echo). He then attends to what 
people say and responds with his own humanlike voice or completes the requested task. In 
contrast with Siri and Alexa, Jibo’s design team have concentrated on making him a fun and 
friendly interactive partner. This is where analyzing his communication from both 
sociocultural and sociopsychological perspectives emphasizes his use of expressive face and 
body movements, easily interpreted by humans in spite of his overtly nonhuman appearance. 
Jibo looks rather like a sophisticated lamp with a tapered cylinder forming his “body” that 
supports a hemi-spherical “head” the flat portion of which contains a “face” formed from a 
liquid crystal display. In spite of this, his body and face support the expression of emotions 
that are easily read by humans. Communication with Jibo is heavily reliant on a voice 
interface, but Jibo’s body and face, which displays a single moving and changing circle “eye” 
most of the time, are, it seems, more expressive than his voice. His eye moves and changes 
shape, allowing Jibo to blink, crinkle his eye and look to one side. His body movement, as he 
sways and turns on three axes, allows Jibo to show gaze direction, make eye contact and 
convey emotions such as excitement and sadness, raising or dipping his head and face. The 
emotional content of Jibo’s communication is not only persuasive, but also positions him as 
caring about the people with whom he interacts. 
At times, Jibo’s face does become a screen that is used to display specific image cues, 
such as a question mark or timer, illustrations for a story he is reading out, or the video feed 
from someone using him as an interface to make a telepresence call. In the latter case, the 
robot becomes a puppet, so the person calling can take control and use Jibo’s gaze to follow 
group conversations. In this situation, Jibo’s personality moves to the side in a way that might 
be rather jarring for those used to interacting with this robot as an autonomous helper and 
friend. In fact, Jibo’s face can also be used as a touchscreen, although the promotional and 
teaser videos do not emphasize this mode of communication with the robot, possibly because 
the act of touching this screen doesn’t sit easily alongside the idea of Jibo as a lively, 
intelligent companion that expresses his personality through this interface as well as his voice 
and body movements. 
Jibo’s only language currently is American English, and his voice is somewhat 
machinelike but, as explained above, provides information with cybernetic-semiotic clarity. It 
seems that, although the narratives that surround Jibo’s goals and abilities tend to stress his 
aliveness and personality, the designers nevertheless expect his voice to help people 
remember he is just a machine. This idea is reinforced by Pieraccini, who explains that from 
the very beginning of the design process the team felt people shouldn’t consider Jibo to be a 
living being; instead, choosing “to remind people Jibo is in fact a robot” (interviewed in 
Rozenfeld, 2017). However, it is unclear whether a voice with machinelike qualities will be 
enough to attain this goal. Adding to the potential for confusion, the idea that Jibo should be 
recognized as a robot is strangely juxtaposed with the importance of designing Jibo to be 
unpredictable, a trait more often associated with living beings than with machines. Pieraccini 
describes asking Jibo what he dreamt last night, to which he will give a different answer each 
day the question is posed. While machines often have a “sleep” mode, they are not usually 
positioned as capable of dreaming, and this type of unpredictability in Jibo seems likely to 
reinforce people’s sense he is somewhat alive, as opposed to being a robot. Indeed, the final 
quote from Pieraccini further complicates the issue when he suggests that “Jibo could live 
forever” (Rozenfeld, 2017), since cloud storage for the robot’s personality and the 
information he has collected means this can all be transferred to a new Jibo when an older 
model stops working or is superseded.  
 Although Jibo isn’t humanlike in form, his communication and the personality he 
expresses is certainly “lively,” and he communicates in humanlike ways. His emotional 
expression, in language and through nonverbal body movements, are a key part of his 
interactions with people, in spite of the design team’s desire to ensure people primarily 
recognize him as a machine. While his developers likely see his expressiveness as a way to 
embed him more strongly into the home environment, it seems possible that this will mean 
his machinelike nature is relatively easily overlooked by those with whom he interacts. This 
understanding may be contrary to some parts of the interview with Pieraccini, but is fitting 
given his final statement.  
 
An Alternative Vision of the Social Robot 
In contrast with Jibo, the fictional robot TARS is not part of a family, but rather is a member 
of a deep space exploration team. Science fiction as a genre provides a thoughtful perspective 
on all types of science and technology including robotics, by embedding depictions of 
human-robot communication within richly imagined social and narrative scenarios. 
Interactions between human characters and TARS in the film Interstellar (Nolan & Nolan, 
2014) demonstrate quite clearly an alternative way to design the communication of robots 
that supports their interaction and collaboration with humans, while also helping to remind 
people that they are machines. TARS is overtly non-humanlike in form. Gendered male, he 
consists of four vertical oblong sections that can join at a number of points, depending on the 
exact form he needs to take to complete a task or to move around. The outer pair of oblongs 
that make up this robot's body can divide down further to create arm-like appendages. The 
narrative explains that TARS was originally built to fulfil a military role, but during the film 
becomes part of a scientific team on a dangerous mission into space. As this excerpt from the 
film’s dialogue demonstrates, TARS has a communication style that gives him a big 
personality to match his large frame: 
 
TARS: Everybody good? Plenty of slaves for my robot colony. [Cooper turns 
to Doyle, a quizzical expression on his face] 
Doyle: They gave him a humor setting so he’d fit in better with his unit, he 
thinks it relaxes us. 
Cooper: A giant, sarcastic robot… what a great idea. 
TARS: I have a cue light [flashes cue light] I can use when I’m joking if you’d 
like 
Cooper: That’d probably help. 
TARS: Yeah, you can use it to find your way back to the ship after I blow you 
out of the airlock. [Pause, then flashes cue light] 
Cooper: What’s your humor setting TARS? 
TARS: That’s 100 percent. 
Cooper: Bring it on down to 75 please. 
 
In terms of being on a mission into the dangerous environment of space, TARS’s 
communication follows an accepted human sociocultural understanding of defusing tense 
situations with humorous banter (this interchange occurring during the initial lift-off). 
Alongside this, his well-developed and very humanlike cybernetic-semiotic communication 
skills are also used to convey mission critical information. TARS’ attempts at humor are 
complemented by the idea of the “cue light,” as a means for his non-humanlike body to 
provide a nonverbal indication that he is being sarcastic or making a joke. This makes good 
sense given TARS’s rather flat vocal tone and lack of an expressive face. In contrast with 
Jibo, TARS is certainly not cute and does not try to get to know the members of the team. 
Maybe it is reasonable to assume that, as a robot, he will already know the details of their 
lives from electronic files of information. TARS certainly isn’t shown as needing to get to 
know people in anything other than the context of the mission and its goals. The way in 
which Cooper can alter TARS’s humor setting with a simple request is a reminder, operating 
within the narrative for the human team members as well as for the film’s audience, that 
TARS is a machine. His personality can clearly be customized to suit a person’s preferences 
or a situation as appropriate. Other parameters mentioned over the course of the film include 
honesty, discretion and trust, all of which shape TARS’s personality and responses to 
questions and situations that arise in the film, and all of which, presumably, could be altered 
by Cooper if required. 
Although a friendship develops between TARS and Cooper, which strengthens over 
the course of the film, this idea is juxtaposed with the recognition that TARS is a robot and 
not alive in the same way as a human. For example, when it is suggested that TARS could be 
used as a probe to collect and relay data from the event horizon of the black hole the team has 
named Gargantua, a mission from which he would be very unlikely to return, Cooper is 
concerned: 
 
Cooper: You’d do this for us?  
TARS: Before you get all teary, try to remember that as a robot, I have to do 
anything you say.  
Cooper: Your cue light’s broken.  
TARS: I’m not joking. [Flashes cue light] 
 
This exchange is somewhat ambiguous (and further complicated by the fact that TARS’s 
honesty setting is only 90 percent). The use of the cue light could either be read as indicating 
that it isn’t broken, and therefore TARS’s comment that “as a robot” he has to do as Cooper 
commands is true. From this perspective, TARS is positioned as a machine for humans to 
expend as they see fit. TARS does not play on this situation. Alternatively, the cue light could 
be taken to indicate that TARS was joking all along. From this perspective, TARS could 
refuse to be used as a probe, but does not. Whatever way this exchange is understood, TARS 
does not attempt to apply sociopsychological pressure by pleading for his cause or making 
Cooper feel guilty and just offers a matter-of-fact statement of the situation. Of course, it 
might be assumed that TARS’s personality, memories and experiences, as is the case for 
Jibo’s, might be copied and stored within the ship, such that as a machine, in contrast to a 
human, TARS effectively will not die even if his body is destroyed. 
Although the use of TARS as a probe is not immediately pursued, the only way to 
save Dr. Brand, the other human member of the team who survives into the film’s final stages 
with Cooper, turns out to involve TARS’s ejection into Gargantua, much to Dr. Brand’s 
consternation: 
 
Brand: Cooper, you can’t ask TARS to do this for us.  
Cooper: He’s a robot, so you don’t have to ask him to do anything.  
… 
TARS: It’s what we intended, Dr. Brand. It’s our only chance to save the 
people on Earth. If I can find a way to transmit the quantum data I’ll find in 
there, they might still make it. 
 
In this exchange, Cooper reiterates TARS’s words from the earlier discussion, clarifying that 
since TARS is a robot it isn’t necessary to ask him to do something, you merely tell him. 
Even as TARS offers comforting words for Dr. Brand, indicating that he is as fully 
committed to saving humanity as a person might be in this situation, it is, of course, only his 
non-humanlike form and abilities that make it possible for him to attempt the mission in the 
first place.  
In contrast with Jibo, whose positioning as a machine is made somewhat problematic 
in the context of his humanlike communication, cuteness and drive to become part of the 
family, TARS occupies a role more attuned to the need for sacrifice in order to achieve a 
team’s goals. As Ian Roderick (2010) suggests is the case for explosive ordnance disposal 
robots, TARS’s relationships with the human members of the team are formed within an 
environment where robots may be sent into danger to save the lives of humans. Strong 
attachments to robots in these situations may be developed precisely because of their life-
saving role (Roderick, 2010). However, the film’s narrative suggests that when robots can 
communicate in humanlike ways, the situation may become complicated. It seems reasonable 
to suggest that human relationships with TARS, who uses humor as a particularly humanlike 
strategy, might develop less as a response to danger, and more as a result of close team 
collaboration over time. Nonetheless, there is potential that, alongside the development of 
human-robot relations which are very humanlike in tone, consistent reminders that a robot 
such as TARS is a machine with a personality that can be tuned by parameter settings, and a 
“life” that is very different from human life, might be helpful. 
 
Phenomenology, Communication Theory and Absolute Alterity 
Another direction from which to consider human interactions with Jibo and TARS, which has 
the potential to support an understanding of their ability to communicate with humans while 
emphasizing the need to retain a clear impression of their nonhumanness, is offered by 
phenomenological perspectives on communication and relations in interaction. Unlike 
cybernetic-semiotic, sociocultural and sociopsychological theory, for which communication 
is a process that relies upon and reinforces the similarities between communicators (and thus 
values only the humanlike aspects of robots such as the iCat, Jibo and TARS), 
phenomenological theories stress the importance of retaining awareness of the difference that 
exists between communicators (Craig, 1999; Pinchevski, 2005; Sandry, 2015). Alongside this 
theory, Don Ihde’s “alterity relation” offers a phenomenological framework that may provide 
a useful way to envision human-robot interactions (1990, pp. 97-108). Ihde describes 
“alterity relations” as “relations to or with a technology” within which humans encounter 
technology as a “quasi-other” (Ihde, pp. 97-98, italics in original). His use of the term 
“alterity” is borrowed from Emmanuel Levinas (1969); although Levinas uses the term to 
encapsulate “the radical difference posed to any human by another human” (Ihde, 1990, p. 
98). For Levinas, alterity can only be present in an encounter with a human other, but Ihde 
extends the term to human-technology relations with the argument that, while technologies 
are not the same as human others, they can nevertheless be encountered as “quasi-other” 
(1990, p. 98). Ihde’s move to consider non-human machines as alterities, relies upon 
particular interpretations of technologies, which he notes are often seen as “problematic” 
(1990, p. 98). The most direct approach is anthropomorphism, “the personalization of 
artifacts”, which ranges “from serious artifact-human analogues to trivial and harmless 
affections for artifacts” (Ihde, 1990, p. 98). Ihde suggests that understandings of “computer 
‘intelligence’ as human-like” are an example of the former, while developing fondness for 
particular objects is an example of the latter (1990, p. 98). 
Jibo’s use of human language, an expressive body and face are designed to cause 
people to anthropomorphize this robot such that “he” becomes a member of the family, 
despite being clearly machinelike in construction. Regarding this robot as a quasi-other 
would seem to make a great deal of sense. However, it is also possible to argue that, from a 
phenomenological perspective, Jibo’s communication does not take pains to reveal his 
otherness, but rather occludes this as much as possible in order to emphasize his liveliness 
and humanlike personality. Jibo is positioned as useful because he can maintain humanlike 
relations with his owners, pushing any sense of his otherness into the background. A similar 
argument might be made for TARS, with his sarcastic humor and evident humanlike 
commitment to the team and its goals. Nevertheless, the ease with which people can alter 
TARS’s personality is telling, as are the non-humanlike physical abilities he possesses. The 
acts of dialing down his humor or upping his truthfulness as required might be understood to 
position him as a quasi-other, whose nonhuman attributes are also valuable, particularly in 
the context of a dangerous mission into deep space. Alternatively, TARS’s overtly nonhuman 
nature might be understood to “temper” the way in which people anthropomorphize this robot 
(Sandry, 2015, pp. 57-58), providing a continual reminder of his otherness, even as they 
enter into a friendship relation with him as part of a team on a dangerous mission. From this 
perspective, TARS may be understood less as a quasi-other, a less-than-human other, to 
become a technological other in his own right, one that should be treated differently from a 
human, but nonetheless respected and valued as a team member. 
 
Conclusion 
Considerations of human relations to robots may seem simple from a perspective that is 
focused on the construction of the robot as a type of machine that draws people into 
communicative interaction; however, negotiating the nature of the relation may well become 
more complicated for people taking part in interactions with the machine, or even for those 
watching interactions between the robot and other humans. The robots discussed in this paper 
can all, in one way or another, be described as encountered by humans in terms of Ihde’s 
alterity relation. However, the details of their communicative actions and the development 
and operation of the human-robot relation in each case are an important part of analyzing 
how these interactions with robots are regarded both by humans in the relation and by 
onlookers. 
The communicative abilities of real-life social robots form the basis for people’s 
sense that they are somehow (or somewhat) “alive,” with individual personalities that 
develop over time. When humans interact with robots they are often encouraged to 
anthropomorphize and on some occasions zoomorphize robots, conferring human or animal 
traits onto machines in ways that carry a perception of liveliness into people’s understandings 
of their existence. Furthermore, human responses to robots are often surrounded by designer 
and mainstream media discourses that narrate the “lives” and “agency” of these robots in 
ways that further support the idea that they can become part of the family, or team members 
at work. This framing of human-robot relations raises the question of how easy it is to switch 
these robots off, or to abandon them to their destruction. The balance point between how 
personable robots are and retaining a clear sense of their machinelike nature might, on 
occasion, be heavily weighted towards understanding them as “alive” because of the strength 
of their sociocultural positioning and the sociopsychological shaping of people’s responses to 
them. 
Some people might love the idea of Jibo’s quirky cuteness, whereas others (including 
me) might be more taken with the idea of “a giant sarcastic robot” that can be asked to dial 
down its humor if the situation (or a person’s state of mind) requires. This suggests it might 
be helpful to develop robots with flexible communication styles and personalities that can 
adapt to people’s preferences. Nonetheless, as this chapter has explored, designs that support 
human-robot collaboration and relation particularly well are also likely to seem the most 
“lively.” It is these robots that become more than tools to the humans with whom they 
interact and, instead, are respected as assistants, co-workers or possibly even friends. While 
the design of non-humanlike robots may help to temper the way that people 
anthropomorphize them during interaction, it seems reasonable to suggest that all robots, 
whatever their form, should communicate clearly about their machinelike nature. A well-
designed robot should not appear able to “die”—its personality and memories lost, rather 
than being saved—unless, as is the case for the Tamagotchi, its death is a key part of the 
interactive relation and narrative it supports. Although designers might be concerned that 
allowing them to clarify their machine status will undermine people’s connection with robots, 
supporting people’s recognition of the absolute alterity of robots as machines should help 
them to remember not only the machine’s specific skills and abilities that make them 
valuable members of multi-disciplinary teams, but also that they demand a new and different 
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